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iii.

The appellant, Eryck C. Aston, files this Brief in reply
to the Brief of Bruno D' Aston, and in support of Eryck7 s request
that this Court quash the Writ of Execution issued by the District
Court, vacate the district court' s Order and Decree issued pursuant
to the Writ, and direct that all of the property seized from Eryck
pursuant

to

the

Writ

be

redelivered

to

Eryck,

or

in

the

alternative, to the Court for further proceedings.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
I.

THE WRIT OF EXECUTION SHOULD BE QUASHED, THE ORDER REVERSED
AND THE SEIZED PROPERTY RETURNED TO ERYCK.
The Writ of Execution and the subsequent Order and Decree

entered pursuant to the Writ by Judge Harding are void, ipso facto,
as a result of the reversal of the underlying Decree of Divorce
between Bruno and Dorothy in D' Aston v. D' Aston, 136 U. A. R. 4 7 (Ut.
Ct. A. 1990).

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Execution, §12; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal

and Error, §955, 956; Restatement Judgments, 2d, §16;
Comment C to the Res taternent Judgments, 2d, §16, states in
part:
"If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed,
the latter judgment is still subject to a post-judgment
motion for a new trial or the like, or is still open on
appeal, ... a party may inform the trial or appellate court
of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the
consequent elimination of the basis of the later
judgment. The court should then normally set aside the
later judgment.11
(emphasis added. )
Utah has recognized this general rule in several cases, including
Phebus v. Dunford, 198 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1948) and Kellv v. Scott, 298
P. 2d 821 (Utah 1956).

Applications of the rule in cases involving

execution proceedings flowing out of overturned judgments are found
- 1 -

in Zurich Insurance v. Bonebrake, 320 P. 2d 975 (Colo. 1958); Lohman
v. Lohman, 246 S. W. 2d 368 (Mo. 1952) (involving a writ of execution
issued on a divorce decree which was reversed).
cases were addressed or distinguished by Bruno.

None of these
They each stand

for the proposition that, in this case, the writ of execution
should be quashed and the property returned to Eryck.
Rule 69, U. R. C. P. begins by stating that "Process to
enforce a judgment shall be by a writ of execution. " A judgment is
the life blood of a Writ of Execution.

A Writ is the mechanism to

enforce

underlying

the

judgment.

Without

the

judgment,

all

proceedings subsequent to the judgment which were engaged in in
reliance upon the judgment are ipso facto void and of no effect.
38 Am. Jur. 2d, Execution §12.
This

Court

stated

in

reversing

the

trial

court

in

the

underlying divorce proceeding (136 U. A. R. at 49):
In summary, we reverse the trial court' s property
distribution and remand for enforcement of the 1973
postnuptial property agreement and then the division of
the remaining property, if any, not controlled by it.
Bruno argues that the reversal of the property settlement
between Dorothy and Bruno does not affect Judge Harding' s decision
in these post judgment proceedings, asserting that the "narrowly
worded

reversal"

of the divorce decree would not affect Judge

Harding' s determination that the codns seized from Eryck belong to
Bruno.

This argument ignores the very essence of the reversal

which opens all issues regarding ownership by Bruno of any personal
property.

In his memorandum decision, Judge Harding awarded Bruno
- 2 -

only the coins which fell in two categories:

(1) those with an "A"

and (2) those contained on lists attached to the divorce decree.
(R. 2238)

Now with the reversal of the decree of divorce, the

second category is eliminated.

The first category contains only 13

coins.
The testimony at the first trial was that some of the
real property given to Dorothy under the post-nuptial agreement was
sold as early as 1973, with the proceeds from the sale being used
by Bruno to invest in coins from various dealers and mints, to
purchase

coins

for Dorothy,

and to generally

expenses in purchasing and investing in coins.

pay

for Bruno' s

(Pages 766-777 of

the transcript from the trial between Dorothy and Bruno. )

Upon

remand, the trial court will be faced with an enormous task in
tracing and determining ownership of many coins.

It is entirely

possible that upon remand every coin seized from Eryck pursuant to
the Writ of Execution will be determined not to belong to Bruno,
but to Dorothy or Eryck.
Judge Park never determined "ownership" of the coins in
the divorce proceedings.

(Finding 17; R. 462-465. )

Judge Park

never determined that any of the coins allegedly taken by Eryck and
Dorothy had ever actually been owned by Bruno.

(R. 454-465)

Judge

Park never determined that coins had actually been taken. (Findings
8, 9, 20; R. 457, 458, 464. )
"consignment" had occurred.

Judge Park never determined that a

(Finding 8, 9, 12; R. 457, 458. )

Any

coins awarded by Judge Park to Bruno were awarded by the decree
(now reversed) subject to Dorothy's interest.
- 3 -

(R. 457-465)

Judge

Park simply divided property, ciwarding the coins to Bruno.

That

award was used in these proceedings by Bruno as the evidence of his
ownership.

The underpinnings for the presumption that Bruno "owns"

the coins listed in the Decree has been removed by the reversal of
the divorce decree.
In support of his contention that the reversal of the
divorce decree does not affect these proceedings, Bruno relies upon
the inapposite Montana cases, Aye v. Fix, 626 P. 2d 1259 (Mont.
1981) (and its predecessor.)

In Aye, the Montana Supreme Court

determined that its reversal of an earlier decision in the same
matter had not affected the trial court* s findings on other facts
which were involved in the subsequent appeal.
decree

which

awarded

coins

to

Bruno

proceedings which are now on appeal.
and remanded.

was

Judge Park' s prior
the

focus

of

the

That decree has been reversed

It cannot be said that Judge Park' s award of the

coins to Bruno was a "collateral" issue. Without the decree of
divorce, not only is there no basis for the Writ of Execution,
there is also no evidence from Bruno of ownership of the seized
property.
In Point II of his Memorandum, Bruno asks this court to
presume

that

all

of the coins listed

in the decree were his

separate property under the post-nuptial agreement, and will remain
his after remand of the divorce proceedings.

This argument asks

this court to ignore the fact that real property owned by Dorothy
was sold and the proceeds of those sales loaned or otherwise given
to Bruno to purchase coins and invest in other items of personal
- 4 -

property.

This Court cannot assume anything about future rulings

in the divorce proceedings.
apply

the

post-nuptial

This Court is not in a position to

agreement

to

the

facts

of

this

case.

Ownership of all of the personal property, including some of the
property seized, remains to be determined.
Bruno argues, (page 8), that "once awarded to Bruno, the
coins would still arguably be subject to division by Judge Park in
the remanded divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy D' Aston. "
This argument assumes a result in both the past and future divorce
proceedings favorable to Bruno, i.e., that the coins were and are
owned by Bruno.

This argument highlights the intertwining of the

reversed divorce decree and this subsequent hearing.

While the

allegedly stolen coins might include coins awarded to Bruno by the
divorce decree, those issues are now open and there still has been
no determination that the listed coins are or ever were Bruno7 s.
Bruno argues that the proceedings between Bruno and Eryck were
based on the complaint, and not on the writ.
made without any reference to the record.

This contention is

The Order which is the

subject of this appeal recites that
"Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause against codefendant Eric D'Aston and plaintiffs' Motion for
an Order direct the delivery of certain personal
property to plaintiff came on regularly for hearing
before the Hon. Ray M. Harding..."
(R. 2325).
The hearing was not one based on the complaint.

As the order

states, the hearing was based upon an order issued pursuant to a
now reversed divorce decree.

- 5 -

There has never been any showing before either Judge
Harding or Judge Park that (i) any of the coins awarded to Bruno by
Judge Park in the Divorce Decree were owned by Bruno (ii) that any
of the coins would be determined to be Bruno' s under the post
nuptial agreement between Bruno and Dorothy, or (iii) that any of
the seized coins were Bruno' s apart from Judge Harding' s reliance
on the lists which were made a part of the reversed decree of
divorce.

(R. 473-538)
The Order and Writ of Execution which gave rise to these

proceedings should be quashed.

Restatement Judgments 2d, §16.
II.

ERYCK WAS DENIED A FULL AND PAIR TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF THE SEIZED COINS.
The proceedings before Judge Harding were not plenary. As
discussed in the opening brief

(p. 10-13), Eryck was denied the

opportunity to present evidence attacking the merits of Bruno' s
claims

of

ownership

of

coins,

based

upon

Judge

Hardings'

determination that ownership of the coins listed in the exhibits to
the decree (now reversed) was fixed by the prior proceedings.
4-5)

(T.

In his Reply Brief, Bruno has not even attempted to argue

that the proceedings before Judge Harding were plenary.
The limited nature of the hearing before Judge Harding
was advanced both by the Court and Bruno.

(R. 2067, 2130, 2186.)

Judge Harding made it abundantly clear to the parties that the
evidence which he would consider was limited by the Decree.
example, the trial court stated at the outset that:
- 6 -

For

And
issue of
property
by Judge
The

the Court will hear no testimony on the
whether or not the consigned coins are the
of the plaintiff as that issue was decided
Park.
(T. 4-5. )

clearest

example

of

the

limited

nature

of

the

proceedings occurred in connection with coins which Bruno claimed
to have obtained by consignment.

During the divorce proceeding,

Bruno testified that he had coins from two consignments, one from
Michael Graham' s company "1841" and a second consignment from Al
Schafer.

(R. 538, 531-33, 536-37. )

Bruno acknowledged to Judge

Harding in these proceedings that the consignment from Al Schafer
was
11

not

a consignment.

(T. 225. )

Bruno' s sole

evidence of

ownership" of many of the coins which were seized pursuant to the

Writ was the purported consignments.
Later, when Eryck attempted to introduce the testimony of
Michael Graham regarding the coins and bullion that Bruno claimed
to have obtained on consignment from Graham, Judge Harding limited
the use of Graham's testimony to impeachment purposes only and
refused to consider Graham' s testimony as evidence of the fact that
no

consignment

had

occurred.

(Tr.

4-7,

498,

499)

Graham' s

testimony that no consignment had occurred was a statement against
Graham' s own interest.

It clearly undermined Bruno' s claim that he

had obtained any coins from Graham by consignment.

Apart from the

alleged consignments and the Decree of Divorce, Bruno presented no
other evidence in support of his burden of proving ownership of the
significant number of coins covered by the consignments.
24 to the Decree of Divorce, R. 529)
- 7 -

(Exhibits

In limiting the use of Graham' s testimony, the trial
court apparently applied principals of res judicata and collateral
estoppel to limit the evidence and issues which it would consider.
This

collateral

estoppel

effect is reflected

at length in the

court' s Findings of Fact, in particular numbers 1, 9, 19 and 21.
(R. 2319-2322.)

Bruno does not dispute the proposition that the

basis for res judicata or collateral estoppel is a final judgment.
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments §457; Smith v. Smith, 793 P. 2d 407, 409
(Utah App. 1990).

In this action, where there is no longer any

final judgment because the decree of divorce has been reversed,
there remains no legal support for Judge Hardings application of
principals of collateral estoppel or res judicata and the resulting
exclusion of evidence.
The significance of the exclusion of evidence and the
absence of collateral estoppel based on the reversal of the divorce
decree

is

twofold.

Initially,

in

an

ordinary

conversion

proceeding, the party alleging conversion has the burden of proving
his ownership of the allegedly converted property "with reasonable
certainty".
the

In this proceeding, Bruno's only proof of ownership of

consigned

coins

was

the

now

reversed

decree

of divorce.

Secondly, the court denied Eryck the opportunity to prove that no
consignment from Graham to Bruno had ever occurred.
This circumstance also highlights the overall short fall
of Bruno' s proof.

Judge Harding merely required Bruno to show that

the coins were contained on the lists attached to the divorce

- 8 -

decree.

Judge Harding apparently concluded himself that beyond the

lists, Bruno's testimony was not truthful.

(R. 2238)

Now that the decree of divorce (including the lists) has
been reversed,

the lists can no longer prove "with reasonable

certainty" Bruno' s ownership of the coins listed in the exhibits to
the divorce decree.
In point III of his Reply Memorandum, Bruno argues that
Eryck was not prejudiced by an exclusion of the deposition of
Michael Graham on the basis that the trial court did "not wholly
exclude the deposition" of Michael Graham.

(Brief, p. 13)

This

assertion ignores the court' s statement that it would consider the
deposition for impeachment purposes only (T. 499) and assumes that
Judge Harding ignored his own ruling and considered the testimony
of Graham for the truth of the matters it addressed.

Such an

assumption is not warranted.
Had the trial court considered Graham' s testimony as
evidence on the matters on which Graham testified, coupled with the
Court' s

own

statements

regarding

the lack

of truthfulness

of

Bruno' s testimony, the result as to a significant number of the
coins would certainly have been different.
allegedly

consigned

Apart from the lists of

coins which were a part of the decree of

divorce, Bruno offered no evidence to meet his burden of proof
regarding ownership of the consigned coins.

It is not possible to

conclude that the Courts refusal to consider Graham' s testimony was
harmless error.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner,

740 P. 2d 1296 (Utah 1988. )
- 9 -

Under the standards

of Rule

61, U. R. C. P. , the trial

court' s reliance upon the Decree and its limitation of evidence,
particularly regarding the consigned coins, constitutes reversible
error.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING BRUNO ATTORNEYS FEES
In its Memorandum of Costs

(R. 2241 and 2242),

Bruno

included a claim for attorneys fees paid to an Oregon law firm in
connection with the deposition of Michael Graham.

Eryck objected

to the inclusion of this item as a cost, but the district court
awarded the attorneys fees as costs.

The inclusion of attorneys

fees in the judgment for costs was error.

Frampton v. Wilson. 605

P. 2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980).
In support of the court' s inclusion of the fees in the
award,

Bruno relies

upon an Arizona

Havatone, 485 P. 2d 574 (1971).

case, Citv of Kingman v.

The Arizona case involved a last

minute deposition taken out of state where the court, as a factor
in

permitting

the

deposition

to

proceed,

required

the

party

desiring to take the deposition to pay the travel expenses (but not
the attorneys fees) for the opposing counsel.

There was also an

order awarding the cost entered prior to the deposition under Rule
30(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.
deposition order was made in the present case.

No such pre-

The City of Kingman

case does not stand for the proposition that attorneys fees are
appropriate as an item of costs in this case.

- 10 -

Bruno

argues

that

voluntarily satisfied.
voluntarily
counsel.

satisfied

the

judgment

for

costs

has

been

In fact, the judgment for costs was not
as

set

forth

in

the

correspondence

of

(Exhibit •'1" attached. ) Payment of the cost judgment was

made under threat of execution.
was not voluntary.

For this reason alone, the payment

IBM v. Lawhorn, 677 P. 2d 507 (Id. A. 1984)

The

case of Jacobsen, Morrin and Robbins Construction Co. v. St. Joseph
High School. 794 P. 2d 505 (Utah Ct. A. 1990) does not apply to the
non-voluntary payment which was made in this case.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS INCLUSION OF
CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN THE DECREE AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS.
The Findings by the trial court, as articulated in its
Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, were very limited in
nature.

The

Decision

"reasonable inference".

itself

makes

frequent

references

to

This somewhat amorphous and perhaps new

level of proof falls far short of the burden of proof discussed in
Burgess v. Small, 117 A. 2d 344 (Me. 1955) and far short even of the
authorities cited by Bruno in his Reply Brief.

No authority has

been offered to this court by Bruno to suggest that a "reasonable
inference" is anything more than mere conjecture.
Perhaps the most disturbing finding entered by the court
is that contained in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (R. 2317,
2318) which states that:
Some of those items, while not exceptionally
rare, would not be expected to appear in an average
coin shop.
- 11 -

There was absolutely no evidence in the record to support this
finding.

Bruno has proposed none in his Brief.

The only testimony

on this subject was that of Al Rust, Eryck' s expert, who testified
to the exact opposite fact, i. e. , that all of the coins on the list
were

readily

available

in

coin

stores.

(T.

462-472)

This

testimony, and the clearly erroneous finding to the contrary, when
coupled with the court's findings made by "reasonable inference",
casts

an

overwhelming

shadow

of

doubt

upon

the

court' s

own

application of the burden of proof to the facts which it claims to
have determined.
Another

revealing

factor

in

the

court' s

Memorandum

Decision was its conclusion that the testimony of both parties
lacked truthfulness.

(R. 2238. ) How can Bruno sustain a burden of

proof of "reasonable certainty" with untruthful testimony?
The court ultimately awarded Bruno only those coins which
fell within two categories:

(1) those bearing an "A" stamp and (2)

those coins which matched items listed on the plaintiff s first
list of stolen property given to the police
2239. )

(Exhibit 57).

(R.

Because of the Court' s conclusion that Bruno' s testimony

was untruthful there is, in the record, no legal basis to support
the award of property beyond those coins with stamped "A's" and
those listed in the decree.

The significance of this limited

determination is that even if we were to assume that coins had been
taken, Bruno would still bear the burden of proving that they were
those seized, and that he owned them.

Bruno' s proof of ownership

must be based upon the strength of his own evidence and not upon
- 12 -

the weakness of Eryck' s evidence.
(Wash. 1986).

Eaaert v. Vincent, 723 P. 2d 527

Considered in the most extreme application, Eryck

could have failed to appear for the hearing and Bruno would have
still had the obligation to prove with "reasonable certainty" that
the coins before the court were his.

As to many items, Bruno

presented no evidence of ownership.
Bruno accuses Eryck of an improper marshalling of the
evidence regarding certain items of personal property which were
improperly included by Bruno in orders prepared for the court' s
signature subsequent to the trial court' s memorandum decision.

In

over seven pages of his opening brief, (P. 19-26) Eryck marshalled
evidence
court.

ostensibly

supportive of the Findings

reached by the

Many of the statements regarding the evidence contained in

Bruno' s Memorandum on pages 16 and 17 are actually discussed in
Eryck' s Brief.

For example, Eryck marshalled the same evidence on

the peace dollars and the "A" stamped on their rim on page 22 at
paragraph 14e of his brief as was advanced by Bruno in his brief.
Many of the alleged

"facts" marshalled

by Bruno are

inaccurate (Brief, p. 16-17):
1.

Bruno claims that Eryck' s collection at the time of
the divorce trial had a value of only $5,000.00,
citing to pages 377 and 517 of the transcript of
that trial.

Those pages make no reference to the

value of Eryck' s collection.

- 13 -

2.

Eryck' s witnesses made no specific reference to the
amount of money which would be necessary to acquire
his inventory.

(T. 4 79)

While other specific discrediting is possible, the point
remains that many of the specific items which Bruno included in
orders which he subsequently prepared for the Court were items
which were either (a) beyond those awarded to him by the memorandum
decision,

or

(b) items which Bruno clearly stated

in his

own

testimony could not be identified as having been owned by him.
Based

upon

the

court' s

Findings

and

its

Memorandum

Decision, plaintiff' s counsel was instructed to prepare Findings,
Conclusions

and a Judgment "consistent with the terms

Decision".

(R. 2240)

From that point forward, the list of coins

which Bruno claimed were covered under the Memorandum
continued to grow.

of this

Decision

It is those additional coins and items which

are the subject of Eryck's discussion (p. 29) that the District
Court committed error in its inclusion of certain items of property
in subsequent Orders.
JL

The 18. 5 gram gold nugget.
The gold nugget did not bear a stamped "A".

gold gram nugget was not listed on the police list.

The 18.5

(Tr. Exh. 57)

The trial court, having determined that Bruno was entitled only to
those items included on the police list or bearing the stamped "A"
(R. 2239), was led into error by Bruno in his inclusion of the 18. 5
gram gold nugget in subsequent orders.

- 14 -

EL

The 84 Common Date BU~Dollars and 60 Common Date CIRC-Dollars
(R. 2328).
There was absolutely no evidence before the trial court

to support any finding or conclusion that the 84 Common Date BU
(brilliant

uncirculated) and

60 common date CIRC

(circulated)

dollars listed in subsequent orders were the same coins alluded to
in the police list.

Bruno has offered no reference to the record

to support the award of these coins to Bruno.

Bruno testified that

(T. 204) circulated dollars are not identifiable, and that no one
can possibly identify common coins. (T. 241)
upon the evidence which is presented to it.

The court must act

There is absolutely no

evidence to tie these particular coins to the coins listed in the
police report.
£L

The Consigned Coins.
These coins are discussed previously.

Bruno offers no

evidence from the record apart from the prior decree of divorce to
support the court7 s inclusion of these items in the award.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the
trial court' s express reliance upon the now reversed and remanded
Decree of Divorce, this matter should be reversed, the Writ quashed
and the property returned to Eryck.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FIXING THE
SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
Subsequent to the trial and after the appeal had been
filed, Eryck filed a motion with the District Court requesting that
the court establish a supersedeas bond to hold the property in
- 15 -

place during the pendency of the appeal.

In support of the motion,,

Eryck filed an affidavit setting forth his opinion that the value
of the coins awarded to his father by the Order and Decree did not
exceed $31,000 in value.

In his opening Brief, Eryck contended

that there had been no evidence during the course of the hearing on
the value of the property and that the only evidence before the
court with respect to the value of the coins awarded to Bruno was
Eryck' s affidavit.
In his Reply Memorandum, Bruno contends that the court
did not abuse its discretion and that there had been extensive and
widely

varying

evidence

concerning

value

presented

at trial.

Specifically, Bruno refers to transcript pages 155, 190, 499, 461
and

472

as

determination

places

in

the

record

of the supersedeas

supporting

bond.

the

court7 s

Not one of the pages

referred to contains any reference to the value of coins before the
court.
excluded.

Bruno's own post hearing affidavit on the subject was
(R. 2417„ )

Apart from Eryck's affidavit, there is no

evidence regarding the overall value of the seized coins.

There

has been no evidence pointed to by Bruno which supports such an
enormous amount for the supersedeas bond.
Even if there had been some other evidence of the value
of the property, the correct measure for the trial court to have
considered in establishing the bond was the potential change in
value of the property during the pendency of the appeal.
Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error, §1058.

5 Am.

The court' s determination that a

$150,000 bond was adequate is no different then a statement that a
- 16 -

$1

million

bond

would

have been adequate.

adequate, but also grossly excessive.

Both

amounts

are

Neither number is based on

evidence actually before the court regarding the potential for the
change in value during the pendency of the appeal.
Bruno argues that issues regarding the supersedeas bond
are not before this court because a separate notice of appeal was
not filed.

(Bruno's brief, p. 20)

No legal authority is cited in

support of this assertion by Bruno, and this court should decline
to consider this contention.

State v. Wareham, 772 P. 2d 960 (Utah

1989); State v. Salata, 155 U. A. R. 23 at 25 (Ut. Ct. A. 1991).
Bruno
harmless.

argues

It is not.

that the error in

fixing

the bond was

When this matter is remanded for further

proceedings, it is likely that the District Court will require some
bond to hold the property before the court during the pendency of
further proceedings.

In that instance, the trial court should be

instructed that it should not automatically establish a bond in the
amount of $150,000, since that amount is not supported by the
record.
VI.
THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT.
Bruno suggests that the appeal in this matter is moot
because he was able to take from the court all of the coins which
were awarded to him by the trial court' s decision.
that

this

occurred

was

because

Eryck

was

The only reason

unable

supersedeas bond to hold the property in place.

to

post

a

After Bruno had

taken all of the property which the clerk would give him pursuant
- 17 -

to the trial court' s orders, the clerk was still left with some
coins which had not been addressed by any order of the court.

At

this time, the parties entered into a stipulation which stated in
part as follows:
WHEREAS, the parties have been instructed by
the court and the clerk to remove the property from
the court, and
WHEREAS, the parties have each expended
considerable sums in advancing their positions
before the court and are desirous of avoiding
further expense in connection with those items, and
WHEREAS, the parties are willing to enter into
an agreement only upon the condition that all of
their rights, claims and objections be preserved
both before the trial court and on appeal,
including each party' s claim that the other is
entitled to take nothing from the court, and
WHEREAS, the parties understand and agree that
this Stipulation is not intended by either to
constitute a satisfaction of the judgment or waiver
of any claim of any type,
NOW THEREFORE. . .
This Stipulation was signed by counsel, an order was entered and
the remaining coins released.

(The Stipulation was filed 9/11/90

and is Exhibit "E" to Bruno's Memorandum in Support of Suggestion
of Mootness filed in this Court. )
Bruno' s suggestion that this agreement renders the appeal
moot is both contrary to the written agreement and without legal
basis.

When this court reverses the trial court' s decision, Bruno

will be accountable to the Court and to Eryck for all of the coins
which were improperly seized, including those which were awarded to

- 18 -

Bruno.

First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P. 2d

591 (Utah 1980).
As

recited

in the stipulation,

the parties

had been

instructed by the court and the clerk to remove the property from
the court.

Contrary to the Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co.,

790 P. 2d 1219 (Utah Ct. A. 1990) case relied upon by Bruno, the
parties in this action specifically dealt with the protection of
their relative positions both before the trial court and on appeal.
The stipulation was not a settlement or agreement on any legal
issue.

It was complying with the demands of the court that the

property be removed.
Bruno

also

relies

upon

a

statement

contained

in

correspondence from Eryck' s counsel to the court that "there is no
question once they [the coins] are released to either Eryck Aston
or

Bruno

Aston

that

they

simply

will

supporting his suggestion of mootness.

not

be

recovered"

as

The statement in the letter

was directed to Bruno Aston' s perceived dishonesty and not to any
legal principle.

Bruno Aston' s counsel has now advised Judge Park

in the Fourth District Court that they have lost contact with Bruno
and have requested to be able to withdraw from representing Bruno
in

further

proceedings

before

Judge

Park.

The

perception

contained in the letter has apparently been borne out.
If this court were to go along with Bruno's suggestion
that this appeal is moot, this court would in effect be stating
that a judgment creditor (Bruno) is free to swoop down upon a third
party

(Eryck) based upon a Writ of Execution issued ex parte
- 19 -

pursuant to a judgment

(now reversed), seize the third person's

property, take the seized property from the court because the third
person has been rendered unable to post a bond, and leave the third
person

(Eryck) with no avenue of appeal.

What Bruno is really

asking this court to say is that because Eryck was unable to post
bond that he cannot have an appeal.
mootness.

This suggestion is not one of

The suggestion is one of over-reaching and the denial of

due process.

Such a broad result is inappropriate and would leave

those harmed the most unable to appeal.

Fed. Proc. L. Ed. §3:631.

Involuntary compliance with court orders does not render the appeal
moot.

I_d. ; McDaniel v. Jones, 679 P. 2d 682 (Kan. 1984* )
This matter is not a mere intellectual exercise.

The

appeal is one seeking to unwind an execution on a judgment which
has now been reversed.
merits.

This appeal should be considered on the

The issues on appeal are not moot.

CONCLUSION
The Order and Decree of the District Court dated March 9,
1990 (R. 2325) and all subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto,
should be reversed with all of the seized property being returned
to Eryck.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

_i/
Keith W. Meade
Attorney for appellant
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1-377-4991

S. Rex Lewis
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Re:

Aston

Dear Rex:
I am in receipt of your Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.
It is acceptable as prepared. The payment which is being made is
being made with the understanding that your client otherwise
intended to execute on the judgment and was made to save the cost
and additional interest which might accrue. We intend to pursue
on appeal the issue that at least part of the costs were not
proper.
I do not expect you to agree or disagree that we retain
the right to pursue that aspect of the appeal, but am simply
advising you of our intent to do so.
You are otherwise entitled to pick up the certified funds
from Mr. Stanger and leave with him the original executed Partial
Satisfaction of Judgment if it has not already been filed with
the court.
Very truly yours,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

Keith W. Meade
KWM/lj
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foregoing document were mailed this <A^

day of May, 1991, in the

United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
S. Rex Lewis
Kevin Sutterfield
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorney for Appellee
120 East 300 North
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Brian Harrison, Esq.
3325 North University
Provo, Utah 84604
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